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Preparatory Committee for the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

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Chairman: Mr. Yelchenko ..... (Ukraine)

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In the absence of Mr. Amano (Japan), Mr. Yelchenko (Ukraine) took the Chair.

The meeting was called to order at 3.45 p.m.

General debate on issues related to all aspects of the work of the Preparatory Committee

1. **Ms. Feroukhi** (Algeria) said that the current session of the Preparatory Committee should relaunch multilateral cooperation and restore confidence in areas with a direct impact on collective peace and security. States parties should engage in discussions on substantive matters related to enhancement of the operation of the NPT and the strengthening of its authority, in accordance with the decisions and resolution adopted by consensus at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference (NPT/CONF.1995/32 (part I), annex) and the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference (NPT/CONF.2000/28).

2. Greater collective efforts were essential in order to overcome the failure of the 2005 Review Conference. Any attempt to reinterpret or renege on the commitments made at the previous Review Conferences would hinder the common effort to achieve balanced results in the interdependent fields of non-proliferation, disarmament and nuclear science.

3. The NPT was very important as a basic instrument for both horizontal and vertical disarmament and non-proliferation. Her delegation encouraged all States that had not yet done so to accede to the existing international instruments on weapons of mass destruction.

4. Working towards nuclear disarmament, as required by article VI of the NPT and confirmed by the Advisory Opinion delivered by the International Court of Justice in 1996, was a matter of concern for all States. The submission of progress reports to each session of the Preparatory Committee and the Review Conference would be a useful means of achieving the goal of "permanence with accountability". The reports would provide updated information on nuclear arsenals and would strengthen confidence and cooperation between States parties, while providing assurances that any reductions made were irreversible.

5. The preparatory process should also identify measures to meet the new challenges to the authority and integrity of the NPT: the revitalization of nuclear programmes and arsenals; the development of new hybrid nuclear weapons that did not require testing; the possibility of expanding the range of scenarios in which nuclear weapons might be used; and even signs of a new arms race in outer space. Those developments undermined confidence and increased the need for non-nuclear-weapon States to have positive and negative security assurances against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. The Preparatory Committee should make a specific recommendation on the conclusion of a binding international instrument on security assurances and the establishment of a subsidiary body for that purpose.

6. Efforts to achieve general and complete disarmament were needed more than ever. Algeria supported a resumption of the substantive work of the Conference on Disarmament on the four main issues: nuclear disarmament, negotiation of a treaty banning the production of fissile material, an end to the arms race in space and security assurances.

7. A legally binding and permanent international and universal ban on all test explosions was needed. The entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) was just one element of the incomplete architecture of the NPT and one of the most important of the 13 steps agreed at the 2000 Review Conference. The annual high-level Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the CTBT and the efforts made to encourage the ten countries listed in annex II which had not yet done so to ratify that Treaty attested to the willingness of States to make the nuclear-test ban universal.

8. Non-proliferation was in dissociable from nuclear disarmament and the role and impartiality of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in the implementation of safeguards in accordance with article III of the NPT was very important. There was growing concern about the risk of weapons of mass destruction or radioactive sources falling into the hands of non-State actors and about the possession of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) by a small number of States. As non-nuclear-weapon States were pressured to take on new obligations in relation to non-proliferation, there should be similar pressures on nuclear-weapon States for the progressive implementation of specific disarmament measures at the international level in accordance with the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference. The IAEA monitoring and verification system should be strengthened in the context of the Trilateral Initiative

agreed between the United States, the Russian Federation and IAEA.

9. All issues relating to international peace and security should be regulated through dialogue and cooperation in the context of international law. Algeria supported all efforts made in the context of the Six-Party Talks to resolve the issue of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. She also urged the five permanent members of the Security Council and Germany to find a durable solution to the issue of the Iranian nuclear programme.

10. Many developing countries with sophisticated industries and technologies were encountering difficulties in acquiring items of nuclear equipment that fell into the category of dual-use technology. That trend was eroding the inalienable right of States under article IV of the NPT to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination. Compliance with the principles of safety and security constituted the appropriate framework for the development of nuclear energy.

11. The establishment of a multilateral mechanism for the provision of nuclear fuel envisaged in the context of non-proliferation might disturb the balance of the rights and obligations of States parties under the current instruments and erode the right to make use of peaceful nuclear applications without discrimination. The political, legal, technical and financial implications of the multilateral approaches should be considered in an in-depth review.

12. The safe use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes required respect for IAEA safety and security standards. Algeria supported the Agency's capacity-building activities, which ensured that countries were able to provide assurances of respect for disarmament commitments. The technical and financial capacities of IAEA for the promotion of energy and non-energy applications should be strengthened, in particular in the context of the renewed interest in the development of nuclear power to meet energy and socio-economic needs and conserve natural resources. The Agency would provide input for the action plan of the High-level African Regional Conference on the Contribution of Nuclear Energy to Peace and Sustainable Development held in Algiers in January 2007. The recommendations made in the context of the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) and the Millennium Development Goals placed emphasis on global acquisition of scientific knowledge as an important lever for the development of the agricultural sector and water resources and the improvement of health services and electricity production.

13. Regional arrangements were important for maintaining peace and security at the regional and global levels, as recognized by Article 52 of the Charter of the United Nations and article VII of the NPT. Algeria had been one of the first States to ratify the African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty (Pelindaba Treaty) and continued to encourage African States to facilitate its entry into force.

14. Algeria had also played an active role in the adoption of the resolution by the 1995 Review Conference on the crucial role of non-proliferation and disarmament in the Middle East region, where existing tensions were hindering peace initiatives. The security of that area could be enhanced by the implementation of a regional control mechanism and the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone. Efforts should also be made to ensure the universality of the NPT and IAEA safeguards and verification systems and to encourage Israel, which had admitted to the possession of nuclear weapons, to accede to those instruments as soon as possible. In the context of the preparatory process, the presentation of a report on the implementation of article VII of the NPT and on the 1995 resolution on the Middle East would help to assess the progress made, as requested by the 1995 and 2000 Review Conferences.

15. The success of the current session would largely depend on the constructive role of both nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon States and their common will to strengthen the effectiveness of the review process and reaffirm the authority of the Treaty. The Preparatory Committee should formulate recommendations for the 2010 Review Conference on how to make progress in strengthening implementation of the NPT and ensuring its universality.

16. **Ms. Espinoza Patiño** (Bolivia) stressed the need to revitalize the NPT in order to meet its main objective of preventing nuclear proliferation while supporting the peaceful use of nuclear energy and the goal of nuclear disarmament and general and complete disarmament. Nuclear weapons were a constant threat to humanity and the Treaty should therefore be signed and ratified by all States, especially nuclear-capable

States, so that the non-proliferation regime could be truly effective and universal.

17. Cooperation activities for the exclusively peaceful and safe use of nuclear energy should be supported and implemented on a transparent basis and in compliance with internationally accepted standards for nuclear safety and the physical protection of nuclear materials. The activities of IAEA should be strengthened, with an appropriate balance among its three main areas of work, namely technical cooperation, security and verification.

18. The IAEA technical cooperation programme provided valuable support for the development of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. All States should contribute to the financing of those activities, which were valuable to human health care (as in the case of the Programme of Action for Cancer Therapy), food improvement and preservation of the environment, management of water resources and other applications of benefit to sustainable development. She reiterated her Government's support for the Regional Co-operative Agreement for the Promotion of Nuclear Science and Technology in Latin America and the Caribbean (ARCAL).

19. Over four decades after the entry into force of the Treaty, and in view of the challenges that had emerged over the past 10 years, greater efforts were needed to ensure that the Treaty emerged from the profound crisis it had entered at the 2005 Review Conference. A constructive and fresh spirit was needed to strengthen the NPT and lay the foundation for further progress in preparation for the 2010 Review Conference. A fragile NPT without an adequate consensus on implementation would be equivalent to greater proliferation and limited action on disarmament. In a world of constant technological development, vertical and horizontal proliferation of nuclear arms had become a threat to global security. Although the international community was aware of the potential danger of those weapons falling into the hands of non-State groups, the full extent of that danger did not seem to have been understood. Global mechanisms were needed in order to monitor technological processes employing nuclear energy in view of the growing threat of a nuclear catastrophe if nuclear energy was used in an uncontrolled manner within the current international system. The NPT included provisions to prevent the horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons and provisions to achieve complete disarmament. Those provisions would have to be translated into commitments if the NPT was to become a universal and credible instrument. The Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (the Treaty of Tlatelolco) had served as a reference point for the establishment of other nuclear-weapon-free zones. Effective coordination between those zones, as agreed in 2005, would be a significant step forward. Bolivia reaffirmed its commitment to supporting the efforts to seek peace and contributing actively to achieving the Treaty objectives.

20. Article VI of the NPT obliged all States parties to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control. A serious policy of disarmament could facilitate the financing of efforts to combat poverty. UNDP and World Bank studies indicated that extreme poverty could be eliminated by investments that were relatively modest compared to the amounts spent on armaments. New actors, challenges and phenomena had recently appeared that threatened peace and security and made development a more fragile process. The NPT showed the way to sustainable and harmonious development, ensuring "the inalienable right of all Parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with Articles I and II" and all States parties undertook to facilitate the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

21. Universal accession to the NPT, together with rapid entry into force of the CTBT, would provide guarantees for the collective security system of the twenty-first century.

22. **Ms. Garcia de Pérez** (Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela) said that international efforts to achieve horizontal and vertical non-proliferation should be accompanied by efforts to achieve nuclear disarmament. The very existence of nuclear weapons was a threat to humanity and only their prohibition could prevent their acquisition by terrorist groups.

23. In view of the impasse reached in multilateral diplomacy for disarmament, the nuclear-weapon States bore the main responsibility for reducing and eliminating their nuclear arsenals in accordance with the letter and spirit of the NPT.

24. The construction of an international system to achieve peace, justice and development required full respect for the rules and principles of international law. Discriminatory practices that imposed compliance with obligations resulting from international agreements on some States but not on others violated the principle of the equality of States.

25. The lack of political will on the part of some nuclear Powers to honour their international commitments had negatively affected the climate of dialogue and understanding that was essential for negotiating agreements, as reflected in the results of the 2005 Review Conference. The nuclear-weapon States had to comply with the unequivocal commitment made in 2000 regarding the total elimination of nuclear weapons.

26. As for the multilateral disarmament agenda, the priorities agreed in the Final Document of the first special session on disarmament continued to be in force, especially as nuclear weapons had continued to develop at an accelerated rate. The Conference on Disarmament should assume fully its responsibilities as the only forum for negotiating agreements in that area. Although no consensus had yet been reached, the assignment of a mandate for negotiation to an ad hoc committee on nuclear disarmament would surely strengthen international efforts in favour of non-proliferation.

27. It was also very important to provide negative security assurances to the non-nuclear-weapon States, as the deterrence doctrines of some nuclear-weapon States did not preclude the possibility of using nuclear weapons. Those States should sign a binding international instrument with a commitment to not use or threaten to use such weapons against countries that did not possess them. During the fourteenth summit of the countries of the Non-Aligned Movement, held in Havana in September 2006, Heads of State had advocated granting such negative security guarantees to non-nuclear countries.

28. A convention was needed that would prohibit the production of fissile material for the manufacture of nuclear weapons and contain specific provisions for verification. It was important to avoid a repetition of the problems with the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, which did not yet have a verification mechanism. As for the scope of the proposed fissile material cut-off treaty, his delegation was conscious of the different points of view existing within the Conference on Disarmament. Nevertheless, it believed that the instrument should include all fissile material, including material in storage.

29. Other measures to strengthen non-proliferation included the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones. Her country reaffirmed its support for the proposal to establish a zone free of weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East. It was essential that Israel, the only country in the region that had neither become nor stated its intention to become a party to the NPT, should renounce the possession of nuclear weapons, accede to the NPT without delay and submit its nuclear facilities to the IAEA safeguards regime in accordance with Security Council resolution 487 (1981). The Israeli Prime Minister's acknowledgement that his country had nuclear weapons was a serious cause of concern, in view of the negative consequences for peace and stability in that region.

30. Her country supported the sovereign right of States to develop their nuclear industry for peaceful purposes in accordance with the provisions of articles I and II of the NPT. It rejected all attempts to alter the nature and scope of those provisions through actions that harmed the integrity of the Treaty. The group of countries which had exerted pressure on the Islamic Republic of Iran in an attempt to force it to renounce its legitimate right to develop its nuclear industry should desist and seek a political and negotiated solution that took into account the interests of the Islamic Republic of Iran as well as those of IAEA. The authority of IAEA had been undermined by the efforts of some countries to politicize the issue by referring it to other bodies that were not familiar with the technical nature of the safeguards system. She called on those States which had not yet done so to sign and ratify the NPT in order to contribute to finding effective solutions to that problem.

31. **Mr. Langeland** (Norway) said that the NPT was under increasing strain, despite its impressive record of contributing to collective security for nearly 40 years. The 2010 review cycle was beginning at a critical stage, when a common vision of how to strengthen the NPT was lacking. Two important opportunities had been missed at the 2005 Review Conference and at the World Summit. In the meantime, serious proliferation challenges had emerged and there was growing fear

that the world was moving towards a second nuclear arms race. It was essential that the NPT process should move forward on a constructive and positive track and return to the spirit of compromise which had prevailed in 1995 and 2000.

32. In the lead-up to the World Summit, Norway, together with Australia, Chile, Indonesia, Romania, South Africa and the United Kingdom had presented concrete proposals which had generated widespread support and could form the basis for efforts to rebuild a broad international consensus on nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament. States parties should reaffirm their common understanding that the NPT was the cornerstone of international security and an indispensable basis for addressing the danger of nuclear proliferation and establishing a world free of nuclear weapons. Nuclear disarmament was clearly an integral part of the NPT package. States parties that complied with the NPT and its non-proliferation obligations had an inalienable right to develop and use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. Norway advocated a comprehensive approach whereby disarmament and non-proliferation should be mutually supportive. Lack of progress in one area, however, should not be used as an excuse for not moving forward on another.

33. With regard to the proliferation challenges posed by the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, his delegation fully supported the decisions taken by the Security Council and reiterated its aim to resolve those two issues through negotiations. It urged the Islamic Republic of Iran to comply with the demands of the international community. The Democratic People's Republic of Korea should honour its obligations under the Beijing agreement reached in February 2007.

34. It was imperative to close any loophole in the nuclear non-proliferation regime. IAEA played a key role in ensuring that peaceful nuclear material was not diverted for military purposes, and should be provided with the necessary political and financial support. The IAEA comprehensive safeguards regime combined with the Additional Protocol constituted the verification standard, and ratification and implementation of the Additional Protocol should be seen as a precondition for taking part in peaceful nuclear cooperation activities.

35. Nuclear terrorism remained a fundamental threat to international security. Security Council resolutions 1540 (2004) and 1673 (2006) called on all States parties to ensure through legal and administrative measures that nuclear materials did not fall into the wrong hands. Norway had provided funding to the United Nations and other institutions to support the implementation of Security Council resolution 1540 (2004).

36. The Proliferation Security Initiative, together with export control regimes, played an important role in supporting the NPT. In 2006, Norway had organized an international symposium on the minimization of highly enriched uranium in the civilian sector. The existence of such material in civilian nuclear facilities could represent a security threat and in all but a few cases it was technically feasible to convert those facilities to the use of low-enriched uranium. Norway urged IAEA and other relevant institutions to continue their support of voluntary minimization projects.

37. A credible non-proliferation regime would greatly facilitate peaceful nuclear cooperation. Countries that had enforced adequate national legislation such as export controls were in a much better position to receive nuclear materials and technology. Multilateral approaches to the nuclear fuel cycle would also help more countries to benefit from nuclear energy and were a prime example of how non-proliferation and peaceful use could go hand in hand. Norway hoped that the NPT community would encourage further progress in that area during the review process. States should ensure that peaceful uses did not undermine non-proliferation efforts, human safety and the environment. Indeed, more efforts were needed in the field of nuclear safety and IAEA had a key role to play in that respect.

38. The NPT was also a disarmament agreement and the ultimate goal was a world free of nuclear weapons. Nuclear disarmament was a priority area for the Norwegian Government. The 1995 Review and Extension Conference and the 2000 Review Conference had identified principles and concrete steps that would facilitate progress on the disarmament agenda. The discussions should be based on the outcome of those two Conferences while also taking account of new developments.

39. Some weeks ago, there had been high expectations that the Conference on Disarmament could reach agreement on a programme of work, which would have allowed the international community finally to commence negotiations on a treaty banning the production of fissile materials for weapons

purposes. Unfortunately, no agreement had yet been reached. A fissile material cut-off treaty would serve disarmament by capping future production of materials for weapons purposes. A legally binding instrument was essential to prevent a possible nuclear arms race. In parallel, the nuclear-weapon States should respond positively to the repeated calls to place excess fissile material under IAEA control and if possible to make it available for civilian nuclear fuel — a prime example of how disarmament could support the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. It was regrettable, in that connection, that the Trilateral Initiative between the United States, the Russian Federation and IAEA had not yet been implemented.

40. Disarmament was not cost-free: Norway had spent over $200 million on the Norwegian plan of action on nuclear safety in North-West Russia. Since 2003, that support had been part of the G8 Global Partnership. In recent years, priority had been given to dismantling decommissioned nuclear-powered submarines and the safe handling and storage of spent fuel and radioactive sources.

41. The nuclear test announced by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea in the previous autumn clearly illustrated the need for early entry into force of the CTBT. In the meantime, Norway called on all nuclear-weapon States to adhere to their test moratoriums and supported the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization in its efforts to complete the International Monitoring System.

42. Although the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty had made a positive contribution, additional cuts were still needed and would be even more urgent with the expiry of the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty in 2009. The United States and the Russian Federation had initiated consultations and Norway urged the two countries to move towards full implementation of the Presidential Initiatives of 1991/1992 on sub-strategic nuclear weapons.

43. Lower numbers of nuclear warheads meant less risk of such weapons falling into the wrong hands. New reductions should be irreversible, transparent and adequately verified. Transparency and reporting were not a matter of choice but an obligation, and nuclear-weapon States should also reduce the operational status of their weapons as agreed in 2000.

44. Nuclear-weapon-free zones could be considered as both disarmament and non-proliferation measures, contributing to regional stability and support for global NPT norms. Such zones should be promoted on the basis of the guidelines of the United Nations Disarmament Commission. They provided an important avenue for legally binding negative security assurances. It was also important to move forward with implementation of the 1995 resolution on the Middle East.

45. The review should also address important institutional matters, such as article X and how to sustain the NPT regime. Norway valued the contributions of civil society groups and followed their recommendations with great interest. An enhanced dialogue with non-governmental organizations and research institutions would not undermine the intergovernmental nature of the NPT, but would rather inspire States to intensify their efforts.

46. **Mr. Skocnic** (Chile) said that Chile attached great importance to the NPT and to the obligations deriving from it. The new review process was expected to obtain better results than the 2005 Review Conference, which had created a sense of frustration despite the substantial efforts made by many delegations.

47. Chile had made efforts to contribute to the balanced strengthening of the three pillars of the NPT: nuclear disarmament, non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and the peaceful use of nuclear energy and technologies. It was in favour of general and complete disarmament and the prohibition and elimination, on a multilateral and verified basis, of all weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery. It also supported the international initiatives for the non-proliferation of such weapons. Negotiations should begin as soon as possible on a fissile material cut-off treaty. Chile had joined Norway, Australia and other States in the seven-country initiative and was also one of the many States supporting the initiative against nuclear proliferation.

48. The NPT was the cornerstone of the non-proliferation regime and, together with other international instruments, formed part of a comprehensive body of law. Chile had signed a Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement with IAEA as well as the Additional Protocol. The Protocol was the most effective international legal instrument for IAEA

in its vital tasks of safeguards and verification. Chile accepted the restrictions imposed by its implementation on the understanding that it was a contribution to international security and encouraged all States to sign the Additional Protocol. Chile had also signed and ratified the CTBT, which should enter into force as soon as possible.

49. Chile, which had ratified the Treaty of Tlatelolco in 1974, supported the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in those regions where they did not yet exist. The immediate objective of a nuclear-weapon-free zone was to strengthen regional security and the security of Member States. Nuclear-weapon States also provided negative security assurances in relation to such zones. The ultimate objective was to achieve general and complete disarmament, as indicated in the preambular part of the Treaty of Tlatelolco.

50. In addition to the instruments referred to, Chile had signed the International Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation. The Code already had over 100 signatory States, including States from all regional groups of the United Nations system. Full implementation of Security Council resolution 1540 (2004) was also very important and his delegation supported the efforts of the Security Council Committee established to achieve that goal.

51. All States parties, and especially the nuclear-weapon States parties, were committed to nuclear disarmament as provided for in article VI of the NPT, as confirmed by the International Court of Justice in its advisory opinion of 1996 and in the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference. The lack of progress on nuclear disarmament, however, had generated an environment of uncertainty and lack of confidence and had had a serious impact on the entire negotiating process at the 2005 Review Conference.

52. His delegation was therefore cautiously optimistic about the results of the present exercise and the present session of the Preparatory Committee should establish a serious foundation for discussion of the substantive and procedural issues included on the agenda. The positive beginning was surely a good omen for the 2010 Review Conference.

53. As the timing of the current session coincided with the fiftieth anniversary of IAEA, the fortieth anniversary of the Treaty of Tlatelolco and the tenth anniversary of CTBT, he hoped that the spirit of Vienna would once again prevail and that the participating delegations would succeed in acting on the political will of States to make real, concrete and verifiable progress towards complete disarmament and the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.

54. **Mr. Milad** (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya) said that his country held the firm position that nuclear weapons and WMD constituted a threat to global peace and security and considered the NPT to be the foundation for the elimination of such weapons, which would remove the pretext for developing countries to obtain such weapons as a deterrent.

55. His country had renounced its nuclear and proscribed weapons programmes in 2003. All States could follow suit, including the nuclear-weapon States, which should be taking the initiative. His country was entitled to be guaranteed that nuclear weapons and WMD would not be used against it. His country had substantiated its position through its active participation in the relevant international meetings and conferences and its accession to numerous conventions and treaties, through which it sought to strengthen international peace and security in line with the aims, commitments and responsibilities arising from the NPT and the Great Green Document on Human Rights in the Age of the Masses.

56. Nuclear-weapon States should halt the development, production and stockpiling of new and advanced nuclear weapons in order to ensure the credibility of the disarmament programme and the universality of the Treaty. International peace and security were the responsibility of all States but prime responsibility for their protection rested with the nuclear-weapon States, through the elimination of nuclear weapons, which posed the prime threat. Nuclear-weapon States should fulfil their obligations under article VI of the Treaty and establish a time frame for the elimination of nuclear weapons and fissile materials within the framework of international verification by IAEA. All States should subject their nuclear installations, fissile and nuclear materials to IAEA guarantees and Additional Protocols and abandon the double standard that contributed to proliferation.

57. In the context of the inalienable right of all States to conduct research into nuclear energy and its use for peaceful purposes and transfer nuclear technology for peaceful purposes to benefit the developing countries,

his country affirmed the right of Iran to develop its nuclear programme for peaceful purposes, under IAEA safeguards. The IAEA was the sole authority competent to verify and guarantee compliance and so prevent the conversion of nuclear programmes to weapons purposes. The issue of compliance applied to all provisions of the Treaty without distinction, in particular the obligations of the nuclear-weapon States to eliminate nuclear weapons.

58. The three pillars of the Treaty — nuclear disarmament, non-proliferation and the right to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes — should be implemented in a non-discriminatory and non-selective manner by all parties, in order not to undermine its credibility.

59. The considerable arsenal of nuclear weapons and technology acquired by Israel, with the assistance of some major States, had contributed to a serious security imbalance in the region and threatened international peace and security. His country called for the elimination of WMD from the entire region and urged Israel to accede to the Treaty and subject its nuclear installations to international monitoring and inspection. The concern felt throughout the region was manifest in General Assembly resolutions since 1974 and in Security Council resolution 487 (1981). The admission by Israeli officials, notably the Prime Minister, that Israel possessed nuclear weapons and capacities constituted a challenge to the entire international community and the situation, which had arisen as the result of the double standard, should be investigated. His delegation therefore affirmed the need to establish the Middle East as a region free from WMD, in order to decrease tension and prevent an arms race with regional and global implications.

60. Considering the threat posed to international peace and security by the obstinacy and desire of the powerful States for supremacy and control, the international community should reward and encourage States that eliminated nuclear weapons, WMD and the associated programmes and equipment, including his country, and should abandon the counterproductive threats and sanctions that strengthened the desire of States to obtain nuclear weapons as a deterrent. Every action provoked a reaction and good deeds were returned in kind.

61. His delegation emphasized the need for States parties to comply seriously with the provisions of the Treaty and work to achieve its universalization, in order to ensure the success of the 2010 Review Conference.

62. **Mr. Okanda Owande** (Kenya) said that the disarmament agenda had been replete with setbacks and disappointments over the past decade. The Conference on Disarmament had been unable to agree on a programme of work. The 2005 Review Conference had failed to reach any substantive agreement owing to the intransigence of a few States. The 2006 Review Conference of the United Nations Programme of Action on Small Arms and Light Weapons had ended in failure. There had recently been a general escalation of military expenditure as a number of nuclear-weapon States were enhancing their nuclear-weapon arsenals and delivery systems. The CTBT had yet to enter into force ten years after its conclusion and significant bilateral agreements had been concluded, with potential negative consequences, outside the framework of the NPT.

63. Despite those setbacks, Kenya remained hopeful that the current session of the Preparatory Committee marked the beginning of a new cycle in the long struggle to rid the world of nuclear weapons. He expressed the hope that the Conference on Disarmament would soon agree on a programme of work that would enable it to embark on substantive negotiations on the basis of a balanced and non-selective approach. In that regard, his delegation commended the efforts made by the six Presidents of the Conference.

64. The 1995 Review and Extension Conference had marked a significant watershed in the history of the NPT. The indefinite extension of the Treaty was not a licence for indefinite possession of nuclear weapons. The agreement had been to ensure permanence with accountability, and all States had made a commitment to specific substantive action and to a strengthened review process. Regrettably, some of the conclusions reached at the 2000 Review Conference, including the 13 practical steps recommended, had not yet been implemented. His delegation repeated the call for an early entry into force of the CTBT. The NPT remained the only instrument for achieving international peace and security based on the principles and objectives of the 1995 Review and Extension Conference and the 13 practical steps agreed at the 2000 Review Conference. Only the total elimination of nuclear weapons could

offer guarantees against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.

65. The 2010 Review Conference should place equal emphasis on the three pillars of the NPT regime: nuclear disarmament, non-proliferation and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Nuclear disarmament was the most important, as it was the only possible guarantee that nuclear weapons would not fall into the hands of terrorists. The highest priority should be the conclusion of a legally binding treaty banning the possession of nuclear weapons. Meanwhile, States should conclude legally binding security assurances against the use of nuclear weapons. The moral, legal and military arguments for their total elimination were compelling. The African Union had adopted a plan of action on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, which had underscored the inalienable right of African States to free access to nuclear energy and technology for peaceful purposes. He urged IAEA to render the necessary assistance to developing countries so that they could have access to that invaluable technology.

66. All existing nuclear disputes should be resolved through diplomacy and within the multilateral framework and his delegation appealed to those countries that had not yet done so to accede to the NPT. The Conference should also address the issue of withdrawal from the Treaty. Attempts by States to conclude bilateral agreements on nuclear energy outside the framework of the NPT should be discouraged.

67. Delegations should reach rapid agreement on procedural issues in order to embark on the substantive negotiations that were needed to strengthen the NPT regime.

68. **Ms. Ashipala-Musavyi** (Namibia) noted the growing recognition that the NPT regime provided security for both nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon States. The indefinite extension of the Treaty in May 1995 had seemed to offer a new beginning for nuclear disarmament, yet there were still no tangible results. The 2005 Review Conference had failed to produce a substantive outcome, the Disarmament Commission had made no real progress on nuclear disarmament, and certain States continued to refuse to ratify the CTBT. The nuclear-weapon States had increased in number and seemed much more concerned with the proliferation of nuclear weapons than nuclear disarmament, as they continued to enhance their nuclear arsenals.

69. The issues addressed at the 2000 Review Conference had included the early entry into force of the CTBT. Agreement had been reached at the 2005 Review Conference on measures to reinforce compliance with both non-proliferation and disarmament obligations. Her delegation appreciated the efforts made but remained concerned that the CTBT had not entered into force.

70. The objectives of the NPT could not be realized by selective implementation of its provisions, nor could the Treaty become universal in the midst of regional proliferation. Namibia supported the objectives of non-proliferation and disarmament enshrined in the NPT, which constituted the only binding commitment to those goals. All States parties, especially the nuclear-weapon States, were responsible for preventing the spread of nuclear weapons and the relevant technology, promoting cooperation in the peaceful use of nuclear energy and pursuing negotiations in good faith on nuclear disarmament under strict and effective international control.

71. Namibia attached great importance to the Algiers Declaration which, recalling the Pelindaba Treaty, reaffirmed the goal of universal adherence to the NPT and the IAEA safeguards regime, reiterated the need for a balanced and non-selective implementation of the NPT provisions and stressed the primary role of IAEA in the promotion of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy for human development. The right of States parties to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy was thus an integral part of the Treaty.

72. While fully aware of the challenges faced by States parties in seeking a consensus on the three pillars of the Treaty, her delegation strongly believed that all of its provisions were equally important and should therefore be implemented in a manner which did not create the impression of selectivity. It was a cause of concern that some States not parties to the Treaty might obtain nuclear materials, technology and know-how for developing nuclear weapons from some of the nuclear-weapon States. There should be no selectivity or double standards. Nuclear weapons were weapons of mass destruction and selective disarmament was therefore tantamount to nuclear proliferation.

73. **Mr. Al-Assad** (League of Arab States) noted that the effectiveness and credibility of arms control institutions had been called into question and the confidence of many States in the non-proliferation regime had been shaken since the 2000 Review Conference. The 2010 Review Conference should provide clear outcomes and practical mechanisms that would restore confidence in the NPT and reassure States that the past three decades had served a purpose and that the objectives of the Treaty had not served particular interests.

74. A number of factors had undermined confidence in the Treaty and in the Review Conference. The three main components of the Treaty were highly interdependent and lack of progress on one front hindered progress on the others. While horizontal proliferation had been tackled, no progress had been made towards the verifiable elimination of nuclear weapons. The arsenals of nuclear-weapon States remained huge, new generations of weapons were being developed and some States were even asserting the option of using nuclear force against non-nuclear-weapon States.

75. The Treaty had not achieved universality and that had undermined the promised security guarantees. All Arab States were parties to the Treaty and had agreed to its indefinite extension. However, the fact that Israel refused to accede and place all its nuclear installations under IAEA safeguards compromised security and contributed to tension in the region. The spread of alarm among States parties or doubts over the wisdom of accepting the indefinite extension would not benefit the non-proliferation regime. Such feelings would continue as long as States not parties to the Treaty were rewarded with technical cooperation from States with advanced nuclear technology, in contravention of article I of the Treaty. The three nuclear-weapon States that had introduced the Middle East resolution should propose a practical method for its implementation.

76. Arab leaders and heads of State had expressed their deep concern at the nineteenth Summit Conference of the Arab League Council in Riyadh over the lack of progress in transforming the Middle East into a nuclear-weapon-free zone and the dangers of nuclear proliferation in the region and their view that Arab policies should be revised and reassessed, in view of the international silence over Israel's possession of nuclear weapons. The League's position on nuclear proliferation in the Middle East was clear: its members opposed the acquisition of nuclear weapons by any State in the region without exception and believed that proliferation should be handled within a comprehensive, integrated regional framework. The current selective approach to individual States diminished confidence in the universal application of the criteria and disrupted regional security, which undermined the credibility of the Treaty.

77. It was crucial for the 2010 Review Conference to achieve the necessary balance in order to ensure a valid and meaningful non-proliferation regime. The Arab League was confident that the majority of States parties to the Treaty were convinced that credible collective security could be achieved only by multilateralism.

The meeting rose at 5.55 p.m.